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Article 5

NOTES
SECURING THE GUARANTEES OF CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the Federal Consumer
Credit ProtectionAct have surfaced from years of controversy and
as predicted reflect an approach to consumer credit regulation that
does violence to many traditionalnotions of consumer protection.
This nation's consumers have over 104 billion dollars in outstanding debt,
held by a variety of institutions including commercial banks, sales finance companies, mutual savings and loan banks, industrial loan companies, savings and
loan associations and innumerable retailers.' Circumscribing these institutions
is a vast body of statutes and administrative regulations that prescribes their
activities and proscribes certain c6nduct. Despite this wealth of legislation, or,
as some suggest, because of it, 2 the consumer remains an ill-informed and abused
participant in the consumer credit market.'
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code' [hereinafter sometimes referred to

1 54 FED. RESERVE BULL., Nov. 1968, at A-52. Of this $104 billion, more than $82
billion is represented by installment credit. The largest single element consists of over $33
billion in automobile paper, which accounts for over forty percent of installment credit. Id.
2 See Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Regulating Consumer Credit,
37 FoRD. L. R. 209, 223 (1968).
3 The problems of the consumer have received a great deal of congressional exposure.
See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); on S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. (1963-64); on S. 1740, 87th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1961-62); on S. 2755, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter cited as 19- Hearings on Truth in Lending]. For discussion of the particular plight of the low-income consumer, see H. BLACK, BuY Now PAY
LATER (1963); THE LAW AND THE Low INCOME CONSUMER

(C. Katz ed. 1968).

4 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is a product of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and has merited the appellation "uniform law" with its
approval by the National Conference on July 30, 1968 and the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association on August 7, 1968. The idea for a uniform consumer law was
conceived in 1957, but it was not until 1963, when the National Conference established its
Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury,
that work started in earnest on the project to reexamine existing consumer protection laws.
The Committee's efforts took them through nine working drafts, subject to extensive discussion, before the UCCC became a reality. The final version was approved for promulgation
and introduction to state legislatures.
For a summary of the work of the National Conference in its efforts to produce the
UCCC, see Richter, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 24 Bus. LAw. 183 (1968); Buerger, Project on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury, 18 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 110
(1964).
For an accounting and justification of the work of the National Conference in implementing other uniform legislation, see 1967 Hearings on Truth in Lending, supra note 3, at 295-97.
For detailed treatment of the provisions of the UCCC, see Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of
Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. Rlv. 1285 (1966); Johnson, Regulation of
Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 66 MICH. L. Rlv. 81 (1967); Jordan &
Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 441
(1967); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. Rxv. 387
(1968); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 445 (1968); Robinson, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, A New Way of Life for
the Consumer Loan Industry, 22 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 118 (1968).
All discussion of the UCCC will be based on the final draft that has been published in

CCH

INSTALMENT CREDIT

GUmE (extra ed. No. 183, 1968).

[Vol. 44:574]

NOTES

as UCCO] and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [hereinafter sometimes referred to as CCPA] are committed to the correction of this situation. The
UCCC is designed to restructure and simplify the total statutory framework
surrounding consumer credit and will replace virtually all regulations with a
single consistent enactment. The COPA is not nearly as comprehensive as the
UCCC and its main impact will be in its requirement that finance charges be
stated by creditors in a uniform manner, namely at a simple annual percentage
rate. The draftsmen of both formulations have recognized the severe economic
and social consequences of the careless use of credit. They visualize the remedy
as being the return of consumer credit to the competitive influences of the market
place - those influences that are revered by our free enterprise system as the
most desirable method of protecting the consumer. Informed use of credit is an
obvious prerequisite to this end.'
Existing regulations are the culmination of legislation and judicial decision
operating without the benefit of perspective. The result is a mass of rules and
regulations that lack integration and are subject to attack on all fronts. The
most vocal criticism - and a rallying point for reform - has been the ineffectiveness of enforcement which, it is argued, renders the substantive guarantees
illusory.' For many,' the worth of the UCCC and the COPA will be determined
5 Pub. L. No. 90-321, §§ 101-504, 82 Stat. 146. The CCPA is composed of four titles. Title
I pertaining to disclosure and advertising is the heart of the Act and most relevant to this
discussion. Title II, which was a floor amendment to the bill, makes extortionate credit
transactions a federal crime. Title III prescribes certain restrictions on the garnishments of
earnings, and Title IV creates a National Commission on Consumer Finance to "study and
appraise the functioning and structure of the consumer finance industry, as well as consumer
credit transactions generally." Id., § 404, 82 Stat. 165.
Truth in Lending was originally introduced by Senator Paul H. Douglas in 1960 as S.
2755 and reintroduced in -the years following as S. 1740 and S. 750. It was finally passed
as S. 5. A more ambitious version of the bill (H.R. 11601) was subsequently passed in the
House of Representatives. A Conference report was agreed to by both Houses of Congress on
May 22, 1968, and on May 29, 1968, President Johnson signed into law the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.
For a discussion of the major controversies dealt with in formulating the CCPA, see
McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit ProtectionAct, 24 Bus. LAW 199 (1968).
6 UCCC § 1.102(2) provides that the purposes and policies of this Act are:
(c) to further consumer understanding of the terms of credit transactions and to
foster competition among suppliers of consumer credit so that consumers may
obtain credit at reasonable cost; (d) to protect consumer buyers, lessees and borrowers against unfair practices by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due
regard for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors; (e) to permit and
encourage the development of fair and economically sound consumer credit practices;
....
CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1 801.
CCPA § 102 provides:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit. Pub. L. No. 90-321, §
102, 82 Stat. 146.
7 See Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 409 (1967).
8 See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
PROCEEDINGS, PuBLIC HEARINGS ON SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE 284-342 and §§ 5, 6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS] where state-

ments and positions recommending amendments to the draft under discussion are presented.

Paul R. Moo, Esq., a member of the Advisory Committee to the Special Committee, in-
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by a judgment as to whether the guarantees provided therein will be actually
secured. This Note will set the framework for such a judgment. It will examine
the present legislative design for enforcement and then discuss the new formulations in light of their efforts to alleviate some of the present deficiencies in
securing enforcement. It should be noted at the outset that the CCPA is, of
course, to operate in the federal structure and is concerned primarily with
disclosure,9 whereas the UCCC is of a more comprehensive design and offered
for promulgation by state legislatures." Further, the problems faced by the
respective draftsmen in providing for compliance were different.' Yet, a common
question runs throughout both: Are the guarantees provided secured by adequate enforcement provisions?
I. Securing Compliance with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Consumer credit legislation has been peculiarly a matter of history. An appreciation of this statement is essential to a proper understanding of both the
deficiences of past regulation and the provisions of the new Uniform Consumer
Credit Code.
A. The Philosophy of Present Regulation
Concern over the protection of the consumer against the unscrupulous
lender or seller is by no means of recent vintage. The Bible's warning that "Thou
shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals,
usury of anything that is lent upon usury"" and its encouragement to "lend
freely, hoping nothing thereby""3 reflect a prohibition that has been traced back
to the Code of Hammurabi.' This prohibition could be total as in early AngloSaxon jurisprudence, or it might be in the form of an interest ceiling.' Usury
and interest statutes appeared in this country as early as 16416 and are presently
in effect in all states with the exception of Maine, Massachusetts and New
cisively observed: "[I]f we had good law enforcement of many of the statutes 'that we have on
the books today, we probably wouldn't have been spending the last three years as we have,
in trying to develop a Uniform Credit Code." Id. at 296.
9 See note 5 supra. With the exception of the garnishment (Title III) and disclosure
provisions (Chapters 2 and 3 of Title I) the CCPA took effect upon enactment. The disclosure
provisions become effective July 1, 1969 and Title III becomes effective July 1, 1970. Pub. L.
No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 167.
10 See note 4 supra. The Special Committee will assist in submitting the UCOC to a
number of state legislatures during their presenit sessions.
11 The differences, which will be expanded upon in the course of this analysis, basically
center on the fact that the UCCC is designed to enter a structure that has provided extensive
credit regulation; it seeks to replace all these other regulations. A number of members of the
credit industry have interests wedded to the existing structure and thus oppose changes in the
regulatory scheme. See discussion throughout PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8. The CCPA, on
the other hand, is the first attempt to provide, on the federal level, general credit regulation.
Hostility to this federal entry into a traditionally local concern is vociferous. For expressions
of this hostility, see 1960, 1961-62, 1963-64, and 1967 Hearings on Truth in Lending, supra
note 3.
12 Deuteronomy 23: 19, 20.
13 Luke 6: 35.
14 See Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 819, 822 (1968).
15 See Berger, Usury In Installment Sales, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 148, 157 (1935).
16 See Benfield, supra note 14, at 824.
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Hampshire. They set interest ceilings that range from .four percent per annum
in North Dakota to thirty percent per annum in Rhode Island."
These statutes operated adequately in dealings between businessmen. There
developed, however, a substantial body of consumers, mostly wage earners, who,
in need of personal loans, found credit institutions uninterested in their plight.
Primarily, this was because the established rate ceilings were considered insufficient to cover the cost of making the small loan to the apparently less creditworthy consumer. Thus, there existed a vacuum, but, as might have been
expected, it was quickly filled by lenders and loan-sharks who operated in
flagrant violation of the usury and interest statutes. The profit to be realized
was so great that substantial penalties provided little deterrence."'
This situation was of some concern at the turn of the century, but a satisfactory solution was not found until the Russell Sage Foundation became interested and sponsored the Uniform Small Loan Law. It fulfilled the twofold need
that existed: first, to eliminate the loan shark and second, to provide protection
for the necessitous borrower." This was accomplished by carving20 an exception
into the usury statute that permitted qualified lenders to charge interest rates
in excess, of that prescribed by the applicable interest ceiling for loans of $300
or less. 2 ' A variety of small loan laws were subsequently enacted in all states.22
The character of the necessitous borrower was paramount in the minds of
the draftsmen. His experience with the loan-shark had evinced his incapacity
to care for himself in the credit market. This inability would be compensated for
by strict supervisioi of the credit transactions, and thus the "price" the lender
had to pay was subjection to strict regulation. Licensing was a prerequisite to legitimate operation, and the terms and conditions of the loan contract-including
maximum
amount of loan and method of repayment - were carefully delineated. 23
17 B. CURRAN,'TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 15 '(1965). Miss Curran's
study is the definitive work on state regulation of consumer credit.
18 For additional discussion of these developments, see id. at 2 and Benfield, supra note
14, at 838-40.
19 gee J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY, ITS COSTS AND
REGULATION 12-13 (1967).
20 "Carving" is used here as a term of precision. It denotes the idea that out of -the
pervasive prohibition against usury, there was cut a very narrow exception that permitted X

per cent above the usury rates to be 'charged for loans within carefully prescribed amounts.
Further, only a select number of creditors were permitted to so operate.

21 See B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 144 for the Seventh Draft of the Uniform Small
Loan Law (as revised June 1, 1942). Maximum loan amounts now range from $200 to as
high as $5000. Id. at 21.
22 The provisions of the Arkansas small loan law were found to be in contravention of
the interest maximum prescribed by that state's constitution. See Strickler v. State Auto
Finance Co., 220 Ark. 565, 578, 249 S.W.2d 307, 313 (1952).
23' The policy statement of the Seventh Draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law, in part,
states that:

1. There exists among citizens of this state a widespread demand for small loans.
The scope and intensity of this demand have been increased progressively by many
social and economic forces.
4. Interest charges are often disguised by the use of subterfuges to evade the
usury law. These subterfuges are so complicated and technical that the usual bor-

rower of small sums is defenseless even if he is aware of the usurious nature of th6
transaction and of his legal rights.
5. As a result, borrowers of small sums are being exploited, to the injury of the
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Commercial banks and other institutions with a variety of credit arrangements also sought to enter the loan field. They petitioned legislatures for an
exemption to the usury statutes and the legislatures responded by carving out
other numerous, carefully delineated, exceptions. The new exceptions, however,
were not integrated into the previous statutes.2" Today, in addition to small loan
laws, most states have statutes for industrial loans,25 installment loans,26 credit
unions,2" and pawnbrokers s that permit certain creditors to charge more than the
general usury rates for loans. Also many states have special provisions authorizing
higher rates for home improvement loans,29 check loans,"0 and others."1
borrower, his dependents, and the general public. Charges are generally exorbitant
in relation to those necessary to the conduct of a legitimate small loan business;
trickery and fraud are common; and oppressive collection practices are prevalent.
7. It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this law to bring under public
supervision those engaged in the business of making such loans, to eliminate practices
that facilitate abuse of borrowers, to establish a system of regulation for the purpose
of insuring honest and efficient small loan service and of stimulating competitive
reductions in charges, to allow lenders who meet the conditions of this Act a rate
of charge sufficiently high to permit a business profit, and to provide the administrative machinery necessary for effective enforcement. B. CuRRAN, supra note 17, at
144-145.
24 See generally id. at 15-82, where the author discusses all aspects of legislation regulating
lender credit.
25 Industrial loans or "Morris Plan" loans evolved contemporaneously with small loan
laws. The industrial banks providing these loans fulfilled a need in the consumer credit market,
occupying a position between the licensed small loan lender and the commercial banking
institution. Small loan lenders were initially limited to -the relatively small-sized loans, and
commercial banks, due to restrictions set forth in the banking and interest laws at this time,
did not participate in the consumer credit market. These industrial banks have become less
significant today, primarily due to the encroachment of their competitors. Small loan lenders
have successfully pushed for higher maximum loans, and commercial banks have vigorously
entered the consumer market as a result of the passage of installment loan laws. See generally
B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 52-60 and chart 7 at 204-19.
26 Installment loan laws provided the primary vehicle by which commercial banks were
able to successfully enter the consumer credit market. Such banks now hold more than
forty per cent of outstanding consumer installment debt. FED. REsERvE BULL., supra note 1, at
A-52-53. In addition to their direct lending activities under the installment loan provisions,
they participate in the market as purchasers or discounters of retail installment sales paper.
Usually these banks need no special licensing under the installment laws, but the loans must
be less than a specified principal and repayable in periodic installments. See generally B.
CURRAN, supra note 17, at 65-75 and chart 9 at 226-43.
27 With the passage of 'the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934. most states were allowed
to pass their own credit union laws. There are now over 23,000 credit unions with over
twenty million members, and their activities create a substantial impact on the credit market.
Regulations are less extensive, and provisions relating to the terms of the loan contract and
to the lender's conduct, characteristics of small loan laws, are not included. B. CURRAN, supra
note 17, at 45-52 and chart 6 at 194-203.
28 Pawnbrokers' activities are regulated, for the most part, by local authorities. The pawnbrokers' loans tend to be in very small amounts (less than $25) and for short periods of time.
Their activities will not be affected by the UCCC. See generally id.at 79-82.
29 While financing home improvements may be accomplished pursuant to the applicable
installment loan acts, a few states make special provision for home improvement loans by
extending the maximum time for repayment under installment loan acts or by increasing the
maximum authorized amount for loans made for home improvements or repairs. For the most
part, such laws are enacted to bring the credit arrangements into conformity with Title I of
the National Housing Act which provides that the Federal Housing Administration shall
insure qualified home improvement loans. See generally id. at 75-76.
30 Banking institutions increasingly provide what have been characterized as "check loan"
plans. These arrangements permit a customer to borrow amounts of money by merely drawing
a check. Even though the customer has no funds in the account on which the check is drawn,
the bank will honor the check pursuant to an earlier agreement Payment of the check
constitutes a loan by the bank to the drawer, and the arrangement is generally subject to the
applicable installment loan law. Four states, however, have enacted legislation regulating
"check loans" separately from other installment loans. See generally id. at 76-79.
31 For a more specific discussion of these statutes, see id. at 15-82.
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While direct lenders found it necessary to go to the legislatures for permission
to operate, retail sales credit, which has been characterized as indirect lending,
developed relatively free from legislative interference. Freedom was found in
the form of the time-price doctrine first announced in the early English case
of Beete v. Bidgood,32 which limited the English usury statute to the direct loan
of money 3 Briefly, the time-price doctrine is the shorthand statement for the
proposition that a merchant may fix one price for a sale for cash and another for
a sale on credit, and the difference will not be treated as an interest charge.
In Hogg v. Ruffner,3 4 the United States Supreme Court applied the Beete
rationale in holding that an Indiana usury statute did not apply to installment
sales contracts. 5 The Court explained:
A vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a
purchaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit; and one who
will not distinguish between things that differ, may say, with apparent truth,
that B pays a hundred percent for forbearance, and may assert that such
a contract is usurious; but whatever truth there may be in the premises,
the conclusion is manifestly erroneous. Such a contract has none of the
characteristicsof usury; it isnot for the loan of money, or forbearance of

a debt."6 (Emphasis added.)

& 7
This highly suspect
economic rationale has been supplemented in one court by
the argument that "a purchaser is not like the needy borrower, a victim of a
rapacious lender, since he can refrain from the purchase if he does not choose
to pay the price asked by the seller." 3 In brief, the consumer here is not the
necessitous borrower.
Whatever the validity of the basis, the time-price doctrine continued, and,
together with the rule that the purchase of a note or contract obligation at a
discount is not subject to usury laws, it became the foundation for a vast consumer credit industry. Unrestrained, sales financing grew into a multi-billion
dollar business, and with this growth came the emergence of unethical practices.
The foundation has come under increasing attack, and signs of erosion are
evident."' Arkansas4 1 and Nebraska42 have overruled the time-price doctrine in

32 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K. B. 1827).
33 See id. at 794.
34 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861).
35 Id. at 118-19.
36 Id. at 119.
37 See Felsenfeld, supra note 2, at 237.
38 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78, 262 S.W. 425,
428 (1924).
39 See Britton & Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act-Historical Background
and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 137, 144 (1958). See generally Greene,
Better Business Bureau Activities in Aid of the Time Purchaser, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
254 (1935).
40 Britton & Ulrich, supra note 39, at 144.
41 Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 607-09, 249 S.W. 2d 973,
977-78 (1952), rehearing denied, 262 S.W.2d 287 (Ark. 1953). Since the parties to the
transaction had relied on previous rulings sustaining the time-price doctrine, the court applied
its reasoning prospectively. See B. CuRRAN, supra note 17, at 84-86, 89-90 for a discussion of
this development.
42 Elder v. Doerr, 122 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Neb. 1963); Stanton v. Mattson, 123 N.W.2d
844, 849 (Neb. 1963); Powell v. Edwards, 75 N.W.2d 122, 128 (Neb. 1956). See also, B.
CuRRAN, supra note 17, at 87-90 where the author describes the decisions in Nebraska and
compares these with the Arkansas results; Britton & Ulrich, supra note 39, at 144-46.
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deciding that a credit sale of goods is subject to the applicable usury or small
loan laws. Other decisions have weakened the remaining foundation by holding
that the sale or discounting of an installment sales contract by a dealer to a bank
or finance company is a loan to the dealer.,"
Although the departure has not been severe and the time-price doctrine
is still firmly entrenched, the attack softened the retail installment sales industry's
opposition to regulation,4 and the enactment of retail installment sales acts
began.4 5 These laws are diverse in coverage but may be divided into three main
types: All Goods Acts, Motor Vehicle Acts and Goods Other than Motor
Vehicles Acts. The element common to all of these acts is the requirement of
disclosure of the essentials making up the sale. Additional provisions to eliminate
certain abuses are increasingly prevalent today. "6
Regulation of retail sales creditors was less strict than that of direct lenders.
As already suggested, the consumer protected by these laws was not characterized
as the "necessitous borrower" and thus he was thought less vulnerable to exploitation." The more recent statutes evince a tendency toward greater regulation, and
many provide that the sales finance company must be licensed before it can
discount paper. However, approval of the license is often just a formality, and
banks which discount paper and which are supervised by a state agency are
generally exempt from this licensing requirement."
The credit institutions and arrangements expanded swiftly under favorable
economic conditions and technological advances. This expansion would not
have been possible, however, but for the legislative and judicial willingness to
create exceptions to the usury laws. The continual "carving out" of exemptions
for new arrangements has resulted in a complexity of regulations. The state of
New York is a representative example-a creditor doing business there may
have to deal with a variety of regulations. There are statutes regulating loans by
consumer finance companies, installment loans by commercial banks, loans by
industrial banks, revolving charge accounts, bank check-credit plans, motor
43 See, e.g., Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 C.2d 335, 341-42, 163 P.2d 869, 872
(1945). In Daniel v. First National Bank, 227 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955), rehearing
denied, 228 F.2d 803, reaffirmed, 239 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1956), the court held that a sales
financing transaction involving a national bank was usurious and subject to the national bank
usury penalty of forfeiture of double the amount of the usurious interest received. The court
found that the relationship between the dealer and -the finance company was so close that the
transaction was in fact a loan by the finance company to the buyer with the dealer acting
as agent. See generally Consumer Credit Symposium: Developments in the Law, Limiting
Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. U.L. R~v. 303 (1960). See also Britton & Ulrich, supra note 39, at 146
for some legislative constrictions on discounting these sales contracts.
44 Britton & Ulrich, supra note 39, at 148.
45 Indiana enacted the first such legislation in 1935. See Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 231, as
amended, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-901 to 934 (1961). Much of this legislation has, however,
been enacted since 1957 and most states now have some form of a retail sales act. Most of
the new retail devices such as revolving credit and add-on contracts have been brought within
the coverage of these acts. For a more thorough accounting of the development of retail
legislation, see the discussion and charts in 1 OCH INSTALMENT CREDXT GUm
35 (1967).
See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 254-329 where the author includes numerous charts
on the details of the retail installment sales acts.
46 See B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 100-01, discussing the provisions proscribing the use of
waiver of defense clauses.
47 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
48 See B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 115-16.
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vehicle installment sales financing, installment 'financing of other goods and
services, insurance premium financing and loans by credit unions."9 If this
creditor were a national consumer finance company operating in all the states
he might find himself. dealing with more than seventy statutes controlling lending,
and if he desired to finance retail sales he would probably deal with another fifty
retail sales statutes.5"
This brief analysis has demonstrated a twofold evolution in the law. On the
one hand, we see the growth of indirect lending through the time-price doctrine
and a variety of more or less comprehensive retail sales acts. On the other hand,
the growth of direct lending, through numerous exceptions to the usury laws has
taken place., New forms of credit and the increasing diversification of credit
grantors has resulted in a credit market wherein the arrangements look more
and more alike. For example, there seems to be -little reason for calling a credit
card purchase of goods either a, sale or a loan, simply because the issuer of the
card is or is not the seller of the goods. It appears that this traditional ad hoc
approach is unsuitable for an intelligent use of credit - a conclusion that is particularly supported by the experience with enforcement of the present regulations.
B.. Enforcement of Present Regulation
1. Licensing and Supervision
The variegated status of exisung regulation is mirrored in the methods of
enforcement authorized in the respective acts. Initially, the plight of the "necessitous borrower" prompted extensive regulation of those who sought to deal with
him. The cornerstone of this control was laid in licensing, which has served a
used to
number of interrelated functions in providing supervision: first, it is,
limit entry into the market place and thereby eliminate marginal operators; second,
it is used as a basis for providing information to state officials as to the identity
of creditors and the areas in which they operate; third, it is sometimes nothing
more than a transparent means of raising revenue to sustain administrative expenses; and fourth, the revocation or suspension of licensing is often used as a
sanction itself."' The licensing statutes of the various states serve at least one, if
not all, of these functions.
The standards used for the granting of licenses to direct lenders are important. Finance companies in a number of states are permitted to lend money
only if the state supervisory authority determines that the grant of a license to
them will "promote the convenience and advantage of, the community." 2 Estab49 Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, supranote 4, at
444-45 & n.7. For a slightly different accounting of the applicable law, see Felsenfeld, supra
note 2, at 213-16.. See also Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 23 J. FINANCE 303, 304-05 (1968).
50 Felsenfeld, supra note.2, at 212-13.
51 See Moo, The Administrative Provisions of the, Uniform Consumer Cizedit Code 7
(unpublished paper on file *with the Notre ,Dame Lawyer).
52 Thirty-four small loan statutes use, in whole on in 'part, the "convenience and advantage" test. The New York statute combines a "conveiience and advantage" test, a
character and fitness test and a minimum assets test. It provides that a license shall be issued
if the superintendent of banks shall find that the financial responsibility, experience,
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lishing this standard often requires a burdensome preparation by an applicant.53
Other states require that the applicant meet prescribed standards of character
and fitness,54 and still others ask only that the applicant file the appropriate forms
and pay the designated fees. 5 Additional common prerequisites to issuance of a
license-and thereby permission to operate-are designation of an agent for
service of process and filing of a bond in lieu of or in addition to the applicant's
assurance that he has minimal assets.56
Continued supervision is often guaranteed by provisions for periodic investigation;57 a few states even permit surprise inspection 8 and free access to all
records.5 9 Authority is frequently given to investigate non-licensees in the same
manner as licensees, if the administrator suspects they may be violating the applicable act.6" These investigatory provisions require the licensee to keep books
and submit annual reports to the administrator.6' His broad supervisory authority is often complemented by general terminology to the effect that the supervisor
may promulgate whatever rules and regulations are necessary to carry out his
62
administrative duties.
Due in part to the non-necessitous character of the consumer in a sales
transaction, and in part to the judicial rejection of the requirement of a legislative
fiat for their existence, members of the retail sales credit industry have, in the
past, suffered a decidedly lesser burden of administrative regulation than did the
small loan creditor and his counterparts in the direct lending business.6" Although
the provisions of the respective state sales finance laws concerning licensing and
supervision are quite diverse, there is discernible today a trend toward more
extensive administrative supervision. Progress of this sort has, however, been
slow and sporadic in the face of the dogged resistance of the "indirect lenders."6 "
character, and general fitness of the applicant . . . are such as to commandt the
confidence of the community and to warrant belief that the business will be operated
honestly, fairly, and efficiently . . . and if... allowing such applicant to engage in
business will promote the convenience and advantage of the community . . . and
if ... the applicant has available for the operation of such business at the specified
location liquid assets of at least twenty-five thousand dollars ....
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 343 (McKinney Supp. 1968). The thirty-four small loan statutes are
cited in Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus. LAW.
227, 232 n.22 (1963). See also Hubochek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer
Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEmP. PRoB. 4, 17-18 (1954).
53 See Felsenfeld, supra note 2, at 243.
54 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-3001 (1964).
55 B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 17. Wyoming provides simply that:
No person shall make any loan . . . until after payment of ten ($10.00) dollars to
the clerk of the municipality in which such loans are made; such payment shall
entitle said person to receive a license for the making of such loans, during the
current calendar year. . . . These statutes are obvious revenue raising devices.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 13-490 (1957) (emphasis added).
56 B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 17.
57 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-605A (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-2036(a)
(1968); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 214.07(4) (1957).
58 See, e.g., ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. 6-605B (1956).
59 See, e.g., ARiz. STAT. ANN. § 6-605C (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 28 (SmithHurd 1966).
60 See B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 19. The administrator or supervisor of the small
loan laws is generally designated to be a specific state agency, e.g., the Banking Department.
61 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.10-12 (1963).
62 B. CURRAN, supra note 17, at 19.
63 Id. at 117.
64 For a brief chronology of the progress of the enactment of retail sales laws, see Britton
& Ulrich, supra note 39, at 151-53.
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A number of enactments require that persons engaged in the business of
purchasing contracts covered by retail installment sales acts be licensed."5 In
only one state are all retailers required to 'belicensed, 6 but others have statutes
providing that if the retailer retains substantial amounts of his own paper,67
engages in purchasing installment paper from other sellers," or is a motor vehicle
dealer,6 he may be required to obtain a license. These statutes, for the most part,
serve only recording and revenue functions and the discretion of the supervisory
authority to refuse to issue licenses is restricted. Proper application, posting of
a bond, and payment of a fee are generally all that is required. °
The comprehensive machinery for detection of violations set out in small
loan laws is not customarily provided for in retail sales acts. Discovery of violations is commonly left to the buyer-obligor, and the authority of the licensing
official to investigate grievances is limited to those complaints actually made by
the consumer.' Some statutes, however, also permit the administrator to initiate
investigations.7 2 As under small loan statutes, the sales finance company may
be required to keep books and records, but annual reports are seldom required."8
2. Penalties under Existing Regulation
Assuming that a violation has been detected, a variety of sanctions is available. They may be categorized into three groupings: (1) administrative action; (2)
civil remedies made available to the debtor-obligor; and (3) criminal penalties.
The extent to which any combination of these is used in actions against the
65 For a chart showing the application of licensing provisions to sales finance companies,
see B. CuRnAN, supra note 17, at 323-29.
66 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.32(1) (Supp. 1969) provides:
For the privilege of conducting, engaging in and carrying on the business of retail
seller engaging in retail installment transactions as defined in this act, there is hereby
levied and assessed upon every such retail seller, for each store located and operated
within this state for the conduct of such business an annual license fee in the sum of
five dollars.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 520.32(2) limits the issuance of licenses to "persons of good moral character."
67 See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 491(7) (McKinney Supp. 1968), which provides that
a "sales finance company" includes
a retail seller of motor vehicles engaged, in whole or in part, in the business of holding retail instalment contracts acquired from retail buyers, which have aggregate
unpaid time balances of twenty-five thousand dollars or more at any time, exclusive
of contracts repurchased from a sales finance company or financing agency ....
68 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 603 (1965) provides that a "sales finance company" includes
a "person engaged . . . in the business of financing . . . the installment sales contracts made
between other parties . ..."
69 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(2)(a) (Supp. 1968) provides that:
No motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle salesman or sales finance company shall
engage in business as such in this state without a license therefor as provided in this
section. ... Every motor vehicle dealer shall be responsible for the licensing of every
motor vehicle salesman in his employ.
70 See B. CuRRAN, supra note 17, at 116. But see N.Y. BANxiNG LAW § 493 (McKinney
Supp. 1968) where the superintendent of banking is given the authority to
refuse to issue a license ... if he shall find that the experience, character and general
fitness of the applicant are not such as to command the confidence of the community and to warrant the belief that the business will be conducted honestly and fairly
within the purposes and intent of this article.
71 See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-4 (1964).
72 Sze, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAw § 497 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
73 B. CuRRA , supra note 17, at 117.
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various credit institutions reflects, once again, the historical segmentation that
pervades legislation in this area.
The licensing authority in the small loan area is given a veritable arsenal
to carry out its responsibility of protecting the "necessitous borrower." The
administrator is empowered to revoke or suspend licenses for a violation of. the
act."4 He also commonly has the power to issue cease and desist orders, 5 and he
7
may invoke the provisions that allow cancellation of interest and/or principal. 1
Injunctions may be brought through the attorney general's office when deemed
necessary by the administrator."'Very often, however, the supervisory authority
prefers to avoid these formal procedures, and instead inforihally tells the creditors
of their error and, if appropriate, requests them to make refunds. It has been
suggested that this non-judicial procedure is justifiable, since it is primarily corrective in nature rather than punitive. 8
The usual civil remedy made available to the borrower in the small loan laws
is the avoidance of his entire debt. 9 Still, a variety of other more or less severe
civil remedies may be imposed on the erring creditor depending on the nature of
the violation." Criminal penalties for wilful violations are almost invariably
provided. 1
Remedies left to the obligor and criminal penalties are of little import in
evaluating the effectiveness of small loan acts due to the extensive provisions for
administrative supervision. Their significance is much different in retail installment sales acts where remedial procedures have been traditionally' left to the
aggrieved consumer in the form of an action for recovery of all or part of the
finance charge.8" In this area, it is true that the trend toward requiring licenses
for sales finance companies does provide relief via the administrative sector, but
this only indirectly affects the erring retailer, who is not subject to any direct
administrative control.8 " Wilful violations are again cause for a criminal prosecution. 4 It is noteworthy that the criminal and civil penalties are very often subject
to a limitation in the form of a savings or exculpatory clause that makes them
inapplicable if the violation is the result of an accidental or bona. fide error, 5
or if the creditor corrects the overcharge after notice from the buyer."

74 Id. at 17-18. For a general discussion of enforcement powers, see Consumer Credit
Symposium: Developments in the Law, Enforcement of Consumer Credit Regulation, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 403 (1960).
75 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6.606A (1956); IDAiro CODE ANN. § 26-2036(d)
(1968).
76 This power seems to be derived from the general civil remedy provisions, and is sparingly used. See generally Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer Credit
Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & Coa. L. REv. 535, 545 (1967).
77 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-2036(d) (1968).
78 Consumer Credit Symposium, supra note 74, at 407.
79 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CoDE art. 58A, § 16(d) (Supp. 1968). For an excellent discussion
on the conformity of penalties to different types of violations, see Felsenfeld, supra note 76.
80 See B. CuRRAN, supra note 17, at 43-44 and chart at 172-93 where an enumeration of
the various penalties is provided.
81 See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 358 (McKinney 1950).
82 See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAW § 414(2) (McKinney 1962).
83 See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROp. LAW § 414(1) (McKinney 1962).
85 See, e.g., Amiz. PEv. STAT. ANN. § 6-628 (1956).
86 See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 414(3) (McKinney 1962).
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3. Evaluation of Present Enforcement
The division of supervisory authority along institutional lines makes generalization difficult. It is clear that the administration of commercial banks, their
installment loan departments, and the other supervised financial institutions in
the large loan field, is primarily directed toward safeguarding the savings of the
public who supply the funds for the use of these institutions. The attitude of the
administrators seems to center on. preventing the overly generous or careless
extension of credit to a high-risk consumer. In short, their charge as promulgated
This
by the legislature is not consumer protection, but depositor protection.
absence of consumer orientation in the supervisory authority is also common to
credit unions. The agency charged with the general supervision of the creation
and operation of these organizations is given responsibility for all aspects of the
credit unions and is not merely concerned with regulating the lender's conduct
toward the borrower.88 This is not true of the administrator of the small loan
companies. His control of licensing, together with his authority for continuous
supervision and power to -impose severe penalties, has been regarded as effectively
securing protection for the consumer. 89 The truth of this is apparent from the
fact that the private remedies of the consumer are not of great significance and
the criminal penalties are seldom used. On the basis of a savings in time and
money, there seems to be little doubt that an effectively functioning supervisory
authority is superior to the traditional law suit.
Administrators have, in turn, called for an arsenal of effective weapons
to be placed at their disposal: "Licensing is the most effective enforcement
weapon";9" in addition, "striking at the pocketbook" in the form of power to
cancel interest and principal"' is also highly regarded. Two additional remedies
cease and desist orders and the permission to seek an injunction - round
out the available weaponry. These are, of course, prospective in nature and consequently the injured debtor must maintain, his own action to make himself
whole.
The evolution of direct and indirect lending has seen administrative authority
charged with the responsibility of enforcing the consumer-borrower's rights,
whereas the consumer as buyer has found it necessary to "fight" for himself,
without any assistance from the state.92 In evaluating this enforcement potential, however, it is unlikely that the distinction between the available retail sales
credit and direct borrowing remedies is justified. Experience has demonstrated
that the consumer in the credit sale is no less subject to exploitation than our

87 See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, supra note 4, at 418.
88 See B. CuRRAN, supra note 17, at 46-47.
89 See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, supra note 4, at 419.
90 Letter from M. L. Rye, Minnesota Commissioner of Banks, to Peter J. Driscoll, January
7, 1969, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
91 Letter from H. Johnson, Counsel, Nebraska Department of Banking, to Peter J. Driscoll,
January 2, 1969, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer. Mr. Johnson further observed that
"[u]nder the installment loan act we cancelled about $300,000.00 of notes of one licensee and
of course cancelled his license. In another case we cancelled about *$100,000.00 &f notes and
also cancelled the person's license. In another case there was $900,000.00 of notes cancelled."
92 See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, supra note 4, at 427.
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"necessitous borrower" in the direct loan situation. The fact is that, for the
most part, he is economically and educationally unable to deal with the market,
and these deficiencies have militated against the possibility of deriving effective
enforcement from the private sector. The consumer, in the first place, is generally ignorant of violations, and even if he does realize that he has been victimized,
the small amounts recoverable, measured against the expense of litigation, are conducive to apathy on his part.3 In addition, attorneys are very often unwilling
to take a consumer's case because of the minimal size of the recovery. 4 Consumer ignorance reduces the effectiveness of the criminal penalty also. Very few
violations are brought to the attention of the prosecuting officials and, even
when they are, these officials are usually too overburdened with the prosecutions
of other crimes to be interested in the seemingly minor or technical statutory
violations occuring in business transactions. 5
The exculpatory provisions for inadvertence or prompt corrections of violations in both civil and criminal penalties are regarded as further hindrances to
the effectiveness of these sanctions. The critics argue that they encourage the
dishonest seller or lender to risk a violation since, even if the violation is detected,
he can still collect the legal service charge, and need return only the illegal
excess to the consumer.

6

C. The Conflicts, Compromises and Resultant Theory of Enforcement in
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code
The basic philosophy of the new Code is founded on three fundamental
principles: first, the belief that the segmentation of the credit market according
to institutions and arrangements is artificial, since there is an essential identity to
every credit transaction; second, the conviction that the submission of this credit
transaction to the competition of the market place is the best method of securing

credit at a reasonable cost; and third, the view that comprehensive and flexible
administrative supervision is essential to effective consumer credit legislation."7
Formulating a code to insure the application of these principles has proven to
be a particularly troublesome task. The essence of the problem is that an internally consistent application of these three tenets results in the discarding of

interests and notions that have received the imprimatur of acquiescence in the
existing regulatory scheme. All sectors of the credit market are on record as

faulting one or more of the provisions of the Code. This section will examine
the draftsmen's philosophy as it is reflected in the enforcement provisions and will
discuss the substance of the opposition that arises from the respective sectors of
the industry when they foresee their interests or beliefs being jeopardized.
93 Economic Institutions and Value Survey: The Consumer in the Market Place A
Survey of the Law of Informed Buying, 38 N.D. LAwYER 555, 593 (1963).
94 Comment, Translating Sympathy For Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs For
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rlv. 395, 409 (1966).

95

Id. at 421, 426.

96 Consumer Credit Symposium, supra note 74, at 412 & n.68, 416-17.
97 For a statement of the basic assumptions on which the UCOC is predicated, see (JCH
INSTALMENT CREDIT GumE, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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1. Licensing
The first and second tenets mentioned above are complementary in that the
artificiality of the present market place precludes consumer comparison and thus
precludes effective, recognized competition. The present regulatory scheme
has fostered quasi-monopolistic positions in some areas of the market
for example, small loan lenders enjoy a virtual lack of competition from
other institutions. The Code does away with this traditional monopoly for small
loan companies with the elimination of amount and rate variances, and thereby
permits consumer finance companies, commercial banks, credit unions and industrial loan companies to compete for the same consumer-customers. 8 In
addition, the uniform disclosure provisions are designed to enable the consumer
to compare the advisability of obtaining a direct loan with financing the product
through the dealer from whom he purchases it. In brief, credit is being placed
in an atmosphere that will subject it to the stabilizing effect of competition.
The difficulty of primary concern here arises in a consideration of the third
tenet. Consumer history was the basis for the decision td have a strong administrative body to guarantee compliance with the Code's provisions. The
sales and large loan fields have until now been supervised by weak administrators,
with the result that enforcement of substantive rights in these areas has been
ineffective.99 Effective enforcement and, consequently, consumer protection have
been provided only where there exists an aggressive consumer-oriented authority,
as under the small loan statutes. Licensing has served as the cornerstone of this
enforcement. Its "convenience and advantage tests" have precluded marginal
operators, and the threat of license revocation or suspension, joined with liberal
investigatory powers, has served as an adequate deterrent.
With this experience, it might be suspected that licensing would serve the
Code as the foundation for administrative supervision. However, this was not
feasible for a number of reasons. First, since licensing is the implement of a
restrictive market, precluding creditors through operation of the "convenience
and advantage test," it is repugnant to the tenet of fostering competition.' 0
Second, there exists the very practical reality of the administrative quagmire
that would result from an attempt to license the thousands of retailers who, under
the Code, fall within the direct supervision of the Administrator.'
Third,
retailers have in fact enjoyed their freedom from direct administrative supervision and have placed themselves on record as being "completely and unalterably opposed to.. . an administrator."'0 2 These retailers, supported by the
sales finance companies and banks that buy their paper, must be acknowledged
as a power to be reckoned with. 0 They see licensing as wholly unacceptable.
From a conceptual, practical and political point of view, therefore, licensing is
98 See N. BUTLER, A SUMMARY OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
supra note 49, at 307; Richter, supra note 4, at 189-90.

CREDIT CODE

7; Johnson,

99 Moo, supra note 51, at 1; Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus.
209, 213-14 (1968).
100 Warren, supra note 99, at 211.
101 See Consumer Credit Symposium, supra note 74, at 410 n.56.
102 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, § 6, at 353.
103 See Richter, supra note 4, at 189.
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an unsuitable cornerstone for building an effective administrative authority that
will be charged with securing compliance from the entire credit industry. On the
other hand, a tentative decision to eliminate all licensing has met strong and
formidable opposition from the National Association of Consumer Credit Administrators, who believe that the exercise of licensing authority is essential to
administration and should not be displaced. Objection has also come from small
loan creditors who have, in the past, paid the "price" of licensing, and today
find themselves rewarded with a virtual monopoly in the small loan field.'
The UCCC "resolved" this apparently irreconcilable conflict with a statutory
compromise that requires any person other than a supervised financial organization0 . to obtain a license if he wishes to engage in the business of
(1) making supervised loans, or
(2) taking assignments of and undertaking direct collection of payments
from or enforcement of rights against debtors arising from supervised
loans, but he may collect and enforce for three months without a
license if he promptly applies for a license and his application has not
been denied.100
"Supervised loans" are defined as "regulated loan[s] in which the rate of the
loan finance charge exceeds eighteen percent per year as determined according
to the provisions on loan finance charges for consumer loans ..... ""' In effect,
the coverage of the Code's licensing provisions approximates the scope of licensing
under present legislation. Indirect lenders, including retailers and sales finance
companies, need not obtain licenses. Only the high interest-low amount creditors,
commonly referred to as small loan lenders, must be licensed under this section.
Further analysis of the application of this section reveals that even this
"compromise" is, in fact, a rejection of the contention that licensing should be at
the heart of effective administration. Many of the ingredients of the customary
licensing requirements are eliminated. The draftsmen, fully aware of the increased scope of administrative responsibility, have removed some of the dayto-day mechanics of licensing. With the hope that the licensing personnel will
concentrate their efforts on detecting violations rather than on the interminable
processing of licensing applications,' the UCCC requires that the supervised
lenders need obtain only a single license for all operations conducted within a
state; in addition, it does not make necessary any burdensome annual renewal
of licenses.
104

105

Moo, supra note 51, at 6.

"Supervised financial organization" is defined in the Code as a
person, other than an insurance company or other organization primarily engaged in
an insurance business, (a)

organized, chartered, or holding an authorization certifi-

cate under the laws of this State or the United States which authorize the person
to make loans and to receive deposits, including a savings, share, certificate or deposit

account, and (b) subject to supervision by an official or agency of this State or of
the United States. CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 4, at 811 [UCCO

§ 1.301(16)]. These organizations primarily are banks and credit unions.
106 Id. at 917 [UCCC § 3.5021.
107 Id. at %916 [UCCC § 3.501(3)]. Only supervised lenders, i.e., those that make available loans in which the rate of the finance charge exceeds eighteen per cent, need be licensed.
Regulated lenders, i.e., those that impose more than a ten per cent finance charge, are within

the ambit of the Code but need not be licensed. Id.
108 Dunham, Unconscionable Conduct and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 J.
FINANCE

312, 318-19 (1968).
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The draftsmen's belief that '.'[t]here is no apparent reason why competitive
forces in a free market cannot be relied on to produce efficient firms which will
serve the public interest"'0 9 required that the traditional "convenience and advantage tests" for licensing be discarded. The UCCC provides a more lenient
standard:
No license shall be issued unless the Administrator, upon investigation,
finds that the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the applicant ... are such as to warrant belief that the business will be operated
honestly and fairly within the purposes of this Act. 110
It is hoped that this licensing test will encourage freedom of entry into the
consumer credit market place; and not be used by the Administrator to preclude
lenders."' Free entry, along with disclosure of credit terms in a uniform manner,
and a high rate ceiling that will permit interest costs to level off somewhere
below it, are seen as the foundations for securing effective competition 12 - one of
the basic tenets of the Code."' However, the antithesis of free entry, the "convenience and advantage test,'! has a long history in consumer credit and many
members of the industry, for a variety of reasons, object to its absence. The small
loan lender, as earlier noted, has had little competition from other creditor institutions. Free entry will eliminate, his monopoly. The commercial banking industry believes that it will suffer if free entry is permitted. Indeed, the Consumer Bankers Association; representing the industry, originally supported the
UCCC project but now opposes the Code primarily because of the free entry concept."' The banks' objection lies in the fact that they cannot expand due to
109

Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, supra note 4, at 432.
INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE, supia note 4, at ff 918 [UCCC § 3.503(2)].
111 The Comment to UCCC § 3.503 notes that
[t]he purpose [of the section] is to facilitate entry into the cash loan field so that the
resultant rate competition fostered by disclosure will generally force rates below the
permitted maximum charges ....
A secondary purpose is to reduce the likelihood of establishing local monopolies
in the granting of cash credit. Id. at 918.
112 Id. at 918 [Comment to UCCC § 3.503].
113 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
114 In a resolution adopted by the Consumer Bankers Association at their 48th Annual
Convention, at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, onfOctober 24, 1968, the Association
expressed its disfavor of free entry. This disfavor was reiterated in an addendum to the
resolution. The addendum provided that:
The nation's banks' and organizations representing them should strongly oppose
provisions of the Code that deal with the following objections:

110 CCH

r

Objection No. 2 ..... "Free Entry"
The proposed Code would allow any "person". to enter the direct consumer
loan field, permitting:
-1. Inter and intra-state branching by large retail chains, personal finance
chains, consumer service companies.
2. The upset of the competitive balance in the consumer lending market
because banks are limited in branching activities.
3. Lenders to enter the field without the restrictions, regulations, examination procedures and tax structure with which commercial banks must comply.
4. The dilution of the power of the individual States to control lending
activities within its borders. [This particular objection was prompted by
UCCC § 3.502 which does not require that a licensee be a state resident.]
5. The burden of paying for administrative costs of the program to be
carried by commercial banks. Addendum to the Consumer Bankers Association Resolution on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
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restrictions on branch offices in their charters, and thus free entry, permitting
other lenders to establish more offices, will be discriminatory toward them. This
objection is acknowledged by the draftsmen who lamely express their confidence in
banking ingenuity to circumvent the problem. 1 5 Opposition is also voiced by the
administrators who will likely be charged with the responsibility of enforcement.11 6
The Commissioner of Banks in Minnesota observed that "[i]t is my opinion,
and it is shared by many, that in this State it would be necessary to have an
amendment to the Code to include convenience and advantage laws .... ,"'
In addition to this opposition, a more serious challenge has been thrust
at the heart of the Code's philosophy. It is argued that there is neither historic
nor economic justification for the draftsmen's expectations that free entry will
foster an efficient and competitive market.'
The principle of free entry creates
a market composed of small operations, whereas the actual economics of the
small loan business demonstrates that it is only through large volume offices that
efficient operations can be provided."' In sum, then, the licensing "compromise" achieved by the Code is subject to severe attack, both by those who have
vested interests under present regulations, and by critics who take issue with the
basic principles of the Code.
Having rejected licensing, the UCCC still needed to provide for some
of the functions that licensing had customarily performed. 2 ' Provision is made
for the procurement of funds to cover costs of administration,' 2 ' and information
as to the essentials of the creditors' business operation is received by requiring
that all creditors file a notice of doing business. 22 These obligations are also
designed for simplicity in administration.'
115 Warren, supra note 99 at 211-12.
116 On May 6, 1968, the National Association of Consumer Credit Administrators approved
a resolution expressing opposition to the UCCC on a number of grounds including the unacceptable licensing provisions. For the text of the resolution, see Consumer Credit Administrators Oppose Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 22 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 131 (1968).
117 See letter from M. L. Rye, Minnesota Commissioner of Banks, supra note 90.
118 Harper, supra note 52, at 228, states: "In response to the unsubstantiated urgings that
freedom of entry will lead only to the good of all, one is reminded of the title of the song
in Gershwin's 'Porgie and Bess'-It Ain't Necessarily So."
119 Id. This writer draws on economic studies of the consumer finance business to develop
a thorough attack on the free entry concept. For an argument in support of free entry also
based on economic studies, see Warren, supra note 99, at 210; Johnson, supra note 49, at 310.
Both sides, strangely enough, are able to draw their economic arguments from the same study:
J.

CHAPMAN &

R.

SHAY,

THE

CONSUMER

FINANCE

INDUSTRY:

ITS

COSTS AND REGULATION

(1967).
120 For an enumeration of these functions, see text accompanying note 51 supra.
121 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUmE, supra note 4, at
987 [UCCC § 6.203].
122 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 4, at
986 [UCCC § 6.202].
The notification shall state:
(a) the name of the person [creditor];
(b) name in which business is transacted if different from (1);
(c) address of principal office, which may be outside this State;
(d) address of all offices or retail stores, if any, in this State at which consumer
credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans are made, or in the case of a
person taking assignments of obligations, the offices or places of business within
this State at which business is transacted;
(e) if consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans are made
otherwise than at an office or retail store in this State, a brief description of the
manner in which they are made;
(f) address of designated agent upon whom service of process may be made
in this State (Section 1.203); and
(g) whether regulated or supervised loans or both are made. Id.
123 See, e.g., id. [UCCC § 6.202(2)], which provides: "If information in a notification
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2. Administrator
Today in many states there exists an administrative division of responsibility
to the extent that different agencies supervise the activities of sales finance companies, commercial banks, and credit unions." It is dear that this disintegration
of uniform authority is conducive to ineffectiveness. It has been argued that
there is
nothing inconsistent as a matter of law or administrative practice in centralizing the supervision and enforcement of the Consumer Credit Code
in a single agency. That other agencies or departments may supervise,
regulate or examine credit unions or savings banks or commercial banks
for fiscal soundness, financial responsibility, asset liquidity, etc., does not
-with the enforcement of the provisions of the Consumer
conflict or overlap
125
Credit Code.

The Code draftsmen are less certain of the feasibility of this approach and,
although they encourage centralized administration, they have realized that this
may not always be politically or constitutionally possible. Therefore, while the
Code recommends that a single official be designated Administrator, it mentions
that where a state elects to appoint two or more agencies to supervise different
creditors, these different agencies should be made components of a single commission and this commission should be designated the Code's administrative
authority.'
Banking institutions and credit unions - often referred to as "supervised
financial organizations" - are expected to remain under the general supervision
of a federal or state official other than the Code Administrator. Yet even in this
situation the UCCC attempts to cultivate uniformity of protection. The
Administrator is precluded from exercising those powers that might interfere
with the internal operations of these "supervised financial organizations." Consequently, he may exercise neither his powers of investigation nor his authority
to issue cease and desist orders. However, as may any individual, the Administrator can petition the courts to enjoin violations of the Code and seek to have
becomes inaccurate after filing, no further notification is required until the following January

31."

124 See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
125 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, § 6, at 354. Mr. Moo continued:
As a matter of fact, the Comptroller, the State Banking Department or agency, the
Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, etc., should welcome and encourage the assumption by a Consumer Credit Administrator of the duties and responsibilities to see
that the particular supervised financial organizations involved are complying with
the rules for making consumer loans or financing consumer credit sales. The
expertise of Administrators charged only with enforcement of consumer credit laws
and regulations is highly preferable to split authority or dual responsibility or the
casting of the burden of enforcement of 'the Consumer Credit Code on the agencies
of government whose primary responsibility in examining supervised financial organizations is to protect financial responsibility and liquidity to safeguard the time
and demand savings of the public supplying funds for the use of those institutions.
Id. § 6, at 354-55.
For a brief discussion of the delicate question of the Administrator's authority over institutions
supervised by other officials, see Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, supra
note 4, at 420.
126 See CCR INSTALMENT CREDIT Gums, supra note 4, at f 971 [Comment to UCC §
6.103].

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

(April, 1969]

penalties imposed.127 Further uniformity is provided under directions given to
the Administrator to cooperate with any state authority having supervisory
responsibility, through joint investigations, prosecution of suits and other official
actions, in enforcing the provisions of the Code." 8 The Administrator is directed
to report information about violations that come to his attention to the appropriate supervisory authority and is given permission to request information
regarding "supervised financial organizations" from the agencies to whom they
are responsible.'29
3. Debtor's Remedies, Criminal Penalties and Administrative Powers
Prior to focusing attention on the actual remedies provided by the UCCC,
the provisions for detecting erring creditors should be mentioned. Those creditors
who are required to be licensed under the Code must maintain appropriate records and submit annual reports to the Administrator. 3 ' The Administrator, in
turn, is required to make general periodic investigations of all licensees "at such
intervals as he deems appropriate,"' 3' and he is given free access to the records
these licensees are required to keep." 2
These potent investigatory tools are not available to the Administrator in
his dealings with those non-licensed creditors who still come within the Code's
jurisdiction. Not only are these creditors not required to maintain complete
records, but it is only upon a finding of "probable cause to believe that a person
has engaged in an act which is subject to action by the Administrator" that
an investigation to determine whether the act has been committed may proceed." ' Allowing investigations of non-licensees only upon a finding of "probable
cause" has been subject to some criticism."' However, since a showing of "probable cause" does not require that a complaint must issue from an aggrieved
consumer, the probable cause limitation may not be unduly burdensome, and,
in fact, may be justifiable, for it will serve to reduce the hostility of indirect
lenders towards submitting to any supervision whatsoever.
Once the investigation is allowed to proceed, liberal methods are provided
to insure its effectiveness. The Administrator is given the authority to compel
the production of books and records, subpoena witnesses and administer oaths." 5
If the person's records are located outside the state, they must either be made
available to the Administrator within the state, or the party under investigation
must pay the expenses for investigation elsewhere. The provision for aiding an
out-of-state investigation is valuable in that it allows the Administrator to "designate representatives, including comparable officials of the State in which the
records are located, to inspect them on his behalf.""' 6 Similar provisions have
127

Id. at 1 973 [UCCO § 6.105(1)].

128 Id. [UCCC § 6.105(3)].

129 Id. [UCCO § 6.105(2)].
130 Id. at 920 [UECCC § 3.505].

131 Id. at f 921 [UGCG § 3.506(1)].
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1 974 [UCOC § 6.106(1)].

134 Moo, supra note 51, at 10.
135 Id. at 921, 974 [UGG §§ 3.506(3), 6.106 (1)].
136 Id. [UCCO §§ 3.506(3), 6.106(2)].
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been made available to Insurance Commissioners and, through their national
associations, joint investigations have been successfully conducted." 7
The private sector has been of little consequence in existing statutory
schemes. As previously mentioned, the consumer's ignorance and subsequent
mistreatment are not adequately remedied through expensive private litigation.
The Code's provisions for debtor's remedies, therefore, do not seem to be idle
work. The requirement of disclosure of finance terms and new simplifications
of the existing credit structure not only will make many consumers more aware
of their rights, but should make them more ready to seek enforcement of them.
Allison Dunham, Executive Director of the National Conference, expressed the
expectations of the Commissioners when he predicted
that the availability of legal services will continue to increase and that along
with this increase will come an increased awareness of the advantages of
consulting a lawyer, publicly or privately provided, about credit problems.
Although there is nothing in the Code which provides for legal services
for the lower income portion of society, a statutory scheme giving debtors
rights can work well as a deterrent only if the creditor segment of society
takes into account the probability of laws [sic] suits for violation of the
Code.13
The inadequate use of private remedies because of the possibility of obtaining only a small recovery is partially met by a prbvision that allows the court to
39
award attorney's fees to the successful debtor."
This, it is' hoped, will encourage
lawyers to assist debtors. Specific provisions permitting recovery'of more than
the amount of proven damages are als6 designed to encourage private actions. 4
Although no explicit provision was thought necessary in the Code,' 4' a procedural
development, one that creditors truly fear, is the increased use of class actions.
For violation of the restrictions on the use of negotiable notes in a consumer credit sale or lease, or of the limitations on the schedule of payments and
terms for regulated loans, the debtor is freed from his obligation to pay the credit
service or loan finance charge; he may also recover a penalty. If a creditor
making supervised loans fails to get a license, the debtor is relieved of his obligation to pay principal or interest. The consumer-debtor is given the right to demand a refund if he has paid an excess charge, and if the creditor refuses to
repay after a reasonable time, -the debtor may recover a penalty not to exceed
the amount of the credit service charge or ten times the amount of the excess
charge, whichever is greater.'42 This last penalty has been criticized as worthless,' but it does seem to provide the debtor some leverage in obtaining a refund
137

Moo, supra note 51, at 9.

138 Dunham, supra note 108, at 316.
139 CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GumF, supra note 4, at 1 963, 964 [UCCC §§ 5.202(8),
5.203(1)(b)]. Some states provide for a mandatory recovery of attorney's fees; see, e.g.,
Micir. ComP. LAw ANN. § 438.32 (1967).
140 See, e.g., CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GUiDE, supra note 4, at 11963 [UCCC § 5.202].
141

142
143

Dunham, supra.note 108, at 316.
CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GuIDE, supra note 4, at

1 963 [UCCC § 5.202(4)].
The Maryland Banking Commissioner stated that:
This section is an exercise in futility at best. The skilled and experienced creditor
who acts unconscionably has to give back the excess. He still gets to keep the
principal and the maximum legally allowable rate of interest; even when he loses,
he wins. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, § 5, at 341A.
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without going to court. If the excess charge was made in deliberate violation
of or in reckless disregard for the Code requirements, the penalty may be recovered even though the creditor refunded the excess charge."' The often-criticized exculpatory clause 45 is apposite and the above-mentioned penalties are
not imposed "[i]f the creditor establishes by a preponderance of evidence that
a violation is unintentional on the result of a bona fide error ....,," Criminal
sanctions follow existing statutory patterns and provide penalties for wilful violations.""' However, the Code's draftsmen have suggested that heavy reliance is
not to be placed on these provisions. 48
Separate civil and criminal remedies are established for disclosure violations of the Code.' 49 This was done to bring the Code into conformity with the
CCPA's "truth in lending" provisions. The CCPA provides that if a state has
substantially similar requirements of disclosure, and adequate enforcement, that
state shall be exempted from the disclosure requirements of the federal act.'
The Code is thus designed to qualify for this exemption and thereby return
control of all aspects of credit transactions to the state level.
In delineating the powers and functions of the supervisory authority, the
National Conference demonstrated a sensitivity toward the existing causes of
present ineffectiveness in administration. It was obvious that, under the Code,
the Administrator would have to be more than a representative of the aggrieved
consumer, in light of the thousands of retailers he must now deal with. However,
it was also clear that private action was not yet an effective weapon and something more was needed to make the abused debtor whole.
The draftsmen have provided the Administrator with the authority to issue
cease and desist orders'' and to seek injunctions 52 for violations of the Code.
Temporary relief is also available where appropriate.'
A controversial innovation was the authority given to the Administrator to
bring a civil action to restrain a creditor or a person acting in his behalf
from engaging in a course of
(a) making or enforcing unconscionable terms or provisions of consumer
credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans;
(b) fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in inducing debtors to enter
into consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans; or
(c) fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collection of debts arising
from consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans.'

54

144 C0H INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 4, at 963 [UCCC § 5-202(4)].
145 See text accompanying note 96 supra.
146 CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT Gumx, supra note 4, at
963 [UCCC § 5.202(7)].
147 Id. at %967 [UCCO § 5.301].
148 Dunham, supra note 108, at 317.
149 CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GuIDE, supra note 4, at 111
964, 968 [UCCC §§ 5.203,
5.306]. For discussion of these remedies under the CCPA, see text accompanying notes 193-98
infra.
150 Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 123, 82 Stat. 146. The National Conference has already
petitioned the Federal Reserve Board requesting that the UCCC be recognized as qualified
for the exemption.
151 CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 4, at
976 [UCCC § 6.108].
152 Id. at 1978 [UCCC § 6.110].
153 Id. at 980 [UCCC § 6.112].
154 Id. at I 979 [UCCC § 6.111]. In this section, the Code points out guidelines to be
used in determining what conduct should be classified as "fraudulent or unconscionable."
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This section manifests a forethought that runs throughout these provisions for
enforcement: the Administrator must have the flexibility to deal with the
imaginative schemes that a small minority of dishonest creditors are likely to
devise. This departure from setting out well-defined standards of conduct disturbs creditor representatives. 5 For them, the discretion that this provision
spells out too often results in arbitrariness. Their success in the courts has not
been encouraging as of late, and they would prefer an acknowledged definiteness
in the control of their behavior. It has been observed that
[t]hose types of contract provisions or clauses which are unfair and oppressive can be specifically interdicted and the validity and enforceability
of financial contracts aggregating more than seventy billion dollars need
not be subjected to the whims and caprice of the personal prejudices of

a court or jury.

In addition to these formal provisions, the Administrator's use of informal action
to obtain voluntary compliance with statutory demands is codified. This procedure authorizes the Administrator to accept from erring creditors written
assurance that they will not engage in illegal conduct in the future; it is designed to encourage creditors and the Administrator to continue to resolve disputes without court proceedings."5 "
All of the administrative provisions discussed above have aimed at preventing future illegality, and do not make the aggrieved debtor whole for any present injustice. Under existing regulations, the aggrieved consumer would probably
have to institute his own legal action to recover his loss. The UCCC draftsmen,
although optimistic about the future of securing enforcement through efforts by
private sector, were not satisfied with the condition of the aggrieved debtor.
Consequently, they also gave the Administrator the characteristics of a debtor
representative. The civil action that allowed the consumer to recover excess
charges is also made available to the Administrator, who may secure the refund
for the debtor. 5 The Administrator's action may, in fact, "relate to transactions
with more than one debtor,"""a and the thought of the Administrator leading
what looks like a class action would not seem to be a happy sight for careless
creditors. There is, finally, a provision that authorizes the Administrator to
sue for a civil penalty of $5,000 for a wilful violation of the act "if the court
finds that the defendant has engaged in a course of repeated and wilful violations in this Act."16 It would appear that this provision's resemblance to a
criminal sanction is more than coincidental.
D.

Conclusion

The Uniform Consumer Credit Code reveals a perceptive awareness of the
weaknesses that have plagued past efforts at consumer credit legislation. The
155
156

157

158
159
160

SeZ PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, § 6, at 364c-367.
Id. § 6, at 366.
CCEI INSTALMENT CREDIT GumE, supra note 4, at
Id. at 981 [UCCC § 6.113(1)].
Id.
Id. [UCCC § 6.113(2)].

977 [UCCC § 6.109].
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elimination of these defects was envisioned by a complete restructuring of the
entire credit regulatory scheme. The basis for this rebuilding rested in the central
philosophy of the Code - the belief that credit should be returned to the
market place.
The consistent application of this philosophy in the drafting of the Code
has produced decisions that alienate various members of the credit industry.
Such alienation, however, is not due to a "short-sightedness" on the part of the
draftsmen. Conflicts were presented, discussed in detail, and compromises were
made. The alienation was the inevitable result of the very application of the
Code's philosophy to the variegated consumer credit market. Competition requires the informed use of credit, and the informed use of credit demands that
credit transactions be treated uniformly. Uniformity, however, requires disturbing many of the traditional beliefs and "vested interests" existing in a
disparate market.
Licensing as the implement for the creation of a restrictive market was
repugnant to the Code's philosophy and was- totally unacceptable to retailers.
The present supervisory authorities, however, demanded the licensing of creditors
who were already subject to their control. The conflict was irreconcilable and
the solution can only guardedly be called a "compromise." The resulting elimination of "convenience and advantage tests" raised a wide spectrum of opposition. Small loan lenders opposed it, and the National Conference of Consumer
Credit Administrators and the Consumer Bankers Association both passed
formal resolutions opposing the Code because of its licensing provisions. Their
hostility will be forcefully manifested in state legislative halls when the UCCC
is considered for adoption. We may expect an attempt to have the Code amended
to include the "convenience and advantage" test, although the addition of this
clause would endanger the goal of competition and thus contravene the basic
philosophy of the Code. On the other hand, an attempt to expand the coverage
of the licensing requirements will draw the ire of indirect lenders, especially
retailers. They oppose administrative interference with their activities and have
succeeded in obtaining a codified requirement that the Administrator must have
"probable cause" to believe they are contravening the Code before he can inquire
into their operations. It can be expected that state administrators will fight to
eliminate this restriction on their authority.
Potential legislative conflict exists also in an analysis of available remedies.
The arsenal of remedies made available to the Administrator is a potent one.
It includes injunctions, cease and desist orders and the right to sue for a civil
penalty on behalf of an aggrieved consumer. The additional authority to enjoin
fraudulent and unconscionable conduct gives the Administrator the needed
flexibility to deal with an ever-changing credit market. A real possibility exists
that this last remedy may be eliminated by states who adopt the Code, in light
of the opposition that the credit industry as a whole has demonstrated toward
this "arbitrary" weapon.
Experience indicates that any predictions regarding the possibility of securing effective enforcement of consumer rights through civil debtor remedies
should be made cautiously. The improved nature of legal services, and the
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employment of class actions in conjunction with the improved UCCC remedies
do, however, offer some encouragement for the future enforcement of rights by
the private sector.
These observations assume, of course, that the UCC(will be adopted without substantial dilution - if it is enacted at all. Bankers oppose it; direct and indirect lenders dislike all or part of it; and even the Administrators who will be
charged with enforcing the Code have recorded their hostility to the provisions
for administration. The UCCO may not survive such opposition. The very
segmentation that is marked for elimination may have fostered interests capable
of preventing the fulfillment of the UGCC promise.
II. Securing Compliance With the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act

A. The Truth in Lending Promise
Dissatisfied with the progress of state legislation in dealing with the problems
of the consumer, and finding that severe economic consequences arise from the
uninformed use of credit, the federal government decided to make an entry into
the consumer credit regulation field.' 61 The result of this effort is the COPA,
commonly called the Truth in Lending Act."6 2 Unlike the comprehensive UCCC,
the federal act is limited to assuring "a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit."'' It does not purport
to supplant existing state regulatory schemes; rather, it superimposes on them
a requirement that credit terms and costs be explained to the consumer in a
uniform manner by*revealing the "annual percentage rate of the total finance
charge.' 64
What the CCPA may lack in comprehensiveness is compensated -for by its
immediacy. Whereas the UCCC has yet to be adopted by any state, the Truth
in Lending Act goes into effect on July 1, 1969.6' Our concern here, as with
the UCCC, is whether the guarantees provided in the statute will be effectively
secured. This concern is not an idle one. Sheldon Feldman, the attorney in
charge of the Truth in Lending activities in the Federal Trade Commission,
has noted that:
161 See note 6 supra for the statement of the congressional findings that prompted the
enactment of the CCPA. The federal government has had extensive experience in regulating
consumer credit trmnsactions as part of the interstate commerce power granted to Congress by
the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The most notable exercise of this
power was its "Regulation W," which required that the consumer be informed of precisely
what he was paying. Both national and state banks are subject to federal authority, and the
federal government regulates fedei-al credit unions. The Federal Trade Commission, in addition
to its activities in the field of advertising, proscribes certain conduct and requires disclosure in
connection with the sale of automobiles; Foi citations to the authority for this federal activity
and discussion of other federal interest in consumer transactions, see Sympbsium, supr note
74, at 403 n.2.
162 Title I of the CCPA has the short title "Truth in Lending Act": however, the entire
act is generally referred to by that name. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 101, 82 Stat. 146.
163 Id. § 102.
164 Id. § 126, 82 Stat. 153.
165 Id. § 504, 82 Stat. 167. The garnishment restrictions take effect July 1, 1970; the
remainder of the CCPA took effect upon enactment.-,
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All of the words spoken on the need for this legislation will be hollow
phrases and all of the legislative work and regulation writing will be
meaningless and wasted effort unless we [the Federal Trade Commission]
'
fulfill the promises that have been made to the American consumer.16
(Emphasis added.)
B. The Problems of Enforcement in the FederalStructure
Much of the controversy that occurred in the eight year gestation period
of the CCPA surrounded the assignment of responsibility for administration and
enforcement of the new Act. Senator Douglas, the original sponsor of Truth
in Lending, proposed that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
be the administrative and enforcing authority. 6 This was thought by some to
be a transparent attempt to avoid the "interstate" limitations placed upon the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. 8 President Kennedy felt that
this responsibility would be best left to the Federal Trade Commission,' 69 and
Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board observed that "administration of
such legislation would not constitute an appropriate activity of the Federal Reserve System.""'
Senator Douglas and later Senator Proxmire seemed to muddy the water
surrounding the issue of who should assume administrative and enforcement
responsibility. They believed the Act would be adequately secured by activity
from the private sector:
Is it not true that under section 7(a) of the bill that the law would be
largely - I would anticipate - self-enforcing; that a consumer who felt
that the law had been violated can sue in court, and in general it would
be my understanding that the law would be enforced in this way. This
isn't to say that it is the only way. But much of the enforcement could be
done on this basis, rather than with the necessary activity of either the
Federal Reserve Board or another Federal agency other than perhaps the
Justice Department.' 7 ' (Emphasis added.)
It would seem that the private enforcement experience under state statutes belies this argument, 7 2 as does the House Report accompanying the Act:
For the relatively unsophisticated consumer, particularly those of modest
means, administrative enforcement will provide their only protection against
unscrupulous merchants or lenders. Such consumers neither will have the
means for instituting their own civil suits, nor adequate knowledge or ex-

166 Address by Sheldon Feldman, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, before the American Home Economics Consumer Credit Workshop at the Cooperative Extension Service, West
Virginia University, Oct. 26, 1968, at 17 [hereinafter referred to as Feldman]. Paginated copy
on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
167 Survey, supra note 93, at 596.
168 Id.
169 Presidential Consumers Message to Congress, 108 CONG. Rac. 4167, 4170 (1962).
170 1961 Hearings on Truth in Lending, supra note 3, at 16.
171 1967 Hearings on Truth in Lending, supra note 3, at 682 (remarks of Senator
Proxmire).
172 See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
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perience to enable them to file a complaint through proper channels
to
17 3
obtain redress through the Attorney General in a criminal action.
The final resolution regarding the administration issue was that the
Federal Reserve Board would be the central agency for formulating and
issuing all substantive regulations on credit disclosure and advertising.""4
Responsibility for enforcement, however, was given to the Federal Trade
Commission, except as to those institutions already subject to the authority
of federal supervisory agencies. Under this exception, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board will be responsible for the enforcement of those regulations affecting
savings and loan institutions; the Comptroller of Currency for national banks;
the Federal Reserve Board itself for state banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for federallyinsured state non-member banks. The Director of the Bureau of Credit Unions
will enforce requirements for federal credit unions. In addition, the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Federal Aviation Agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Agriculture will exercise jurisdiction over the
institutions that they traditionally control." 5 It is submitted that this divisiveness
will do little to ensure consistent enforcement. The traditional lack of consumerorientation in these agencies may well produce inconsistencies that will render the
ideal of meaningful disclosure illusory. It is conceded, however, that the creditors under the jurisdiction of these agencies should not be the institutions that
give rise to problems with compliance.
The major problem areas are expected to fall within the ambit of the Federal
Trade Commission's responsibility. The Commission expects its jurisdiction to
encompass creditors holding approximately fifty billion dollars in consumer
debt. 6 These creditors will include consumer and sales finance companies;
home improvement companies, service creditor companies and retailers of all
kinds.177 For the purpose of pursuing its assigned responsibility, the Act provides:
All of the functions and powers of the Federal Trade Commission under
the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the Commission to
enforce compliance by any person with the requirements imposed under this
title, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or
meets
78
any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Providing the Commission with this weaponry seems to exhibit an unawareness
of past experience and suggests an expedient solution rather than a complete
perception of the problem.
The Federal Trade Commission has been constantly decried as "notoriously
173 H. R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1967).
174 Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 148. Pursuant to its mandate the Board issued
proposed regulations. 33 Fed. Reg. 15506 (1968).
175 Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 108, 82 Stat. 150.
176 Feldman, supra note 166, at 13.
177 Id. For an idea of the scope of the FTC's responsibility, consider that there were 1200
sales finance companies with outstanding credit of over sixteen billion dollars in 1965, and
2500 personal finance companies with loans totaling nine billion dollars. These companies
have innumerable branches, and the Commission also has responsibility for approximately
two million retailers. Id. at 13-14.
178 Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 108(c), 82 Stat. 150.
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ineffective,"' and the cause of this ineffectiveness is found in the limited scope
of its enforcement powers and their attendant inexpeditious procedure.'
The
Commission has no authority to punish or to collect damages; its only function
is to prevent, through the use of cease and desist orders. 8' This scope of authority
might have served well the slower-paced antitrust problems for which the Federal
Trade Commission was originally designed, but when the Commission decided
to concern itself with false advertising, the cease and desist order did not function to provide immediate relief for the consumer. 2 Realizing this, the Commission developed the procedure of "consent orders" which permit an earlier
resolution of complaints, since they do not require the time-consuming administrative processes that surround the issuance of cease and desist orders.'
In addition, informal procedures are employed. Yet even these additional procedures cannot rid the Commission of the label "ineffective."
Little value would be derived from a documentation of the deficiencies in
the Commission's performance of its duties. Myriad studies have analyzed
them,'8 4 and the Commission itself acknowledges its past ineffectiveness and
seems acutely aware of it in light of its newly assigned responsibility:
The Commission is not deaf to the voices of its critics, and we know full
well that there is ample room for improvement in the effectiveness of
our activities ....

In spite of what some would have you believe, we are

not content with our past efforts, and I think that this lack of complacency
is in itself a healthy sign. We recognize that we must search for new ways
to make progress in a war that can never be
and that
85 completely won is what we hope to do in Truth in Lending.
The Commission expects that the very nature of its new charge will be conducive
to a more expedient determination of violations. 6 Although it will continue to
petition for a power in the nature of a temporary injunctive order,8 7 it is ex179 Warne, Advertising-A Critic's View, J. MARKETING 10, 13 (Oct. 1962). See also
Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor,
24 FED. B.J. 548 (1964); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64
COLUmn. L. R~v. 439 (1964); Comment, supra note 94, at 442-45.
180 Comment, supra note 94, at 444.
181 1968-69 U.S. GoVT ORG. MANUAL 465.
182 See Millstein, supra note 179, at 451.
183 For an enlightening discussion of the development of the use of consent orders, see
Baum & Baker, Enforcement, Voluntary Compliance, and the Federal Trade Commission, 38
IND. L.J. 322 (1963).
184 See articles cited in note 179 supra.
185 Feldman, supra note 166, at 19-20.
186 Interview with Sheldon Feldman, Attorney-in-Charge of Truth in Lending, Federal
Trade Commission, in Washington, D.C., January 7, 1969.
187 A number of interests have recommended that the FTC be given a power in the
nature of a temporary cease and desist order. In its most recent report to Congress, the Commission has suggested in its legislative recommendations that section 13(a) (1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act be amended to read as follows:
Section 16(a). Whenever (1) the Commission has any reason to believe that
any person . . . is engaged in, or is about to engage in, acts or practices that
violate any law administered by the Commission, and the Commission has issued,
or intends to issue, a complaint against such acts or practices, and (2) it would be
in the public interest to enjoin such acts or practices until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on review or until an order to
cease and desist made thereon by the Commission has become final, the Commission
by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district
court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts or practices. Upon proper showing
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pected that efficiency in securing the "Truth in Lending" guarantees will be
attainable without it.'
Cases presently take about a year to reach the Commission level for issuance of a complaint;. 9 this is primarily because the nature of
the activities dealt with demands time-consuming investigation. Violations of
"Truth in Lending," however are of per se nature, and should therefore be
dearly definable without extensive fact gathering. Tentative plans exist to
shorten the period prior to the issuance of a complaint to a few weeks through
the use of field examiners that will periodically investigate the institutions within
the Commission's jurisdiction, as well as receive complaints. If the erring creditor
does not submit to a consent order at the time of the complaint, it is again
expected that the per se nature of the violation will permit rapid follow-through
and issuance of a cease and desist order. 9 This order, however, can be challenged by the respondent in the court of appeals by an action brought within
sixty days of issuance; it is not final until exhaustion of the last opportunity to
appeal' 9 ' In this way, if a creditor does not wish to conform to the mandate
of the CCPA, it will be possible for him to continue his profitable violation of
the Act for an extended period. If all available appellate review is taken advantage of, an order that can actually terminate the illegal practice might not
be forthcoming for as long as three years. 9
For failure to conform to the disclosure requirements, the creditor is liable
for twice the amount of the finance charge in an action brought by an aggrieved
consumer. Liability, however, is limited to a minimum of $100 and cannot be
greater than $1,000. °" Litigation from the private sector is encouraged by a
provision that allows costs plus attorney's fees'to be recovered.' 9 Although such
a civil remedy appears necessary for consumer protection, it has been criticized
as creating an influx of unwanted small claims in the federal courts. Since the
jurisdictional amount requirement was recently raised ,to $10,000 .to relieve the
crowded dockets in the federal courts, Congress appears inconsistent in permitting
$100 suits to be brought there.'95 In any case, the creditor may escape liability
if he "shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such error."' 96 Liability is also avoided
if correction of the error is made before its detection by the creditor. 9
Criminal penalties are applicable for a knowing and wilful violation of the

a temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. Any
such suit shall be brought in the district in which such persons, partnership, or
corporation resides or transacts business. 1967 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, at 75-76. This request would seem futile in light of the fact that even
presidential requests that the FTC be given injunctive powers have fallen on deaf ears. Comment, supra note 94, at 445.
188 Interview with Sheldon Feldman, supra note 186.
189 Comment, supra note 94, at 444.
190 Interview with Sheldon Feldman, supra note 186.
191 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
192

1967 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, at 76.

193
194
195
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disclosure and advertising provisions. 98 As previously noted, the UCCC has
adopted these federal provisions providing civil and criminal remedies for disclosure violations in its effort to qualify as a statute that will pre-empt the
application of the CCPA."9'
C. Conclusion
Whereas the UCCC was placed under the control of a new, powerful and
flexible Administrator, the enforcer of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is
of an altogether different breed. Not only is the Federal Trade Commission a
creature of an earlier era, but it is today severely restricted in the implements it may
employ to secure the new promise of "Truth in Lending." Nevertheless, the Commission has expressed optimism about its ability to enforce the guarantees of the
CCPA. Present proposals envision field offices staffed with lawyers who will scrupulously examine the numerous creditors under the Commission's authority. The
inexpedience so prevalent in other Commission activities will hopefully be eliminated in part through the readily detectable nature of the violation itself.
The plans which will, hopefully, render the Commission effective are, of
course, only preliminary, and subject to the assurances of increased manpower
and available funds. Chairman Dixon admits that the Commission is understaffed now;'"0 in addition, it is possible that Congress will only provide a
fraction of the Commission's appropriation request. Analysis here might easily
slip into cynicism, yet it must be noted that some of those who contributed to the
near unanimous vote that made "Truth in Lending" the law, may have done so
because support of the bill was politically advantageous."' There may be practical insight to be gained from the fact that after Congress passed the popular
truth-in-packaging legislation it proceeded to trim the appropriations for the
enforcement of it.2"2 It would be unfortunate indeed if meaningful enforcement
of the consumer guarantees provided in the CCPA become jeopardized by an
unresponsive political climate.
Peter 1. Driscoll
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